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IMMIGRATION LAW 
DEFENSES AND RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION-RE-
CENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
Bill Ong Hing* 
INTRODUCTION 
A review of the Federal Reporter for the 1979-1980 term 
reveals that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has been 
the busiest federal court of appeals in the immigration and de-
portation area.1 This is a direct reflection of the high appre-
hension and deportation statistics in the western states for the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service.2 The immigration deci-
sions of the Ninth Circuit therefore directly affect large number 
of aliens and have great national significance. The discussion 
which follows surveys several key areas in which the Ninth Cir-
cuit has had significant impact in the past year on the develop-
ment of defenses and relief from deportation. 
I. SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION 
Under section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (the Act), the "Attorney General may, in his discretion, sus-
pend deportation and adjust the status" of a deportable a1jen to 
that of a lawful permanent resident if certain statutory condi-
tions are satisfied. S In general, there are three eligibility require-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Golden Gate University; J.D., University of San Fran-
cisco, 1974; LL.M. (candidate) University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall); Former 
Director, Immigration Law Unit, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Founda-
tion; Staff Advisory Group, Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. 
1. See e.g., 604-628 F.2d (1979-1980). 
2. See 1977 I.N.S. ANN. REP. 89. 
3. Section 244(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976), provides: 
As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney 
General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust 
the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney 
General for suspension of deportation and-
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ments: continuous physical presence, good moral character, and 
a showing of hardship.· During the past year, tlie Ninth Circuit 
has decided several important cases pertaining to the continuous 
physical presence and hardship requirements. 
A. Continuous Physical Presence 
Depending on \Yhat ground for deportation applies, an alien 
applying for suspension of deportation relief must have been 
"physically present in the United States for a continuous pe-
riod of not less than" seven or ten years.& However, in Chan. v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service,s the Ninth Circuit held 
that even though the aliens had made several departures of up 
to ninety-five days during the seven-year period, the continuous 
physical presence requirement had been satisfied, and in de Gal-
lardo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,7 the same 
court found that a vacation of three and one-half months did 
not necessarily break the co~tinuity requirement. 
At first glance, tho Chan and de Gallardo holdings appear 
4.Id. 
5.Id. 
cept the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsec-
tion; has been physically present in the United States for a 
continuous period of not less than seven years immediately 
preceding the data of such application, and proves that during 
all of such period he was and is a person of good moral charac-
ter; and is a person who deportation would, in the opinion of 
the Attorney Gen1lral, result in extreme hardship to the alien 
or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United 
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence; 
or 
(2) is deportable under paragraphs (4), (5), (6), (7), (11), 
(12), (14), (15), (16), (17), or (18) of section 241(a) [8 U.S.C. § 
1251(a)}; has beeu physically present in the United States for 
a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately fol-
lowing the commission of an act, or the assumption of a status, 
constituting a ground for deportation, and proves that during 
all of such period he has been and is a person of good moral 
character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the 
opinion of the Attorney" General result in exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, 
or child, who is 8. citizen of the United States or an alien law-
fully admitted for permanent residence. 
6. 610 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Tang, J.; the other panel members were Good-
win, J., and Lydick, D.J., sitting by designation). 
7. 624 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were 
Nelson, J., and Wilkins, D.J., sitting by designation). 
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to totally ignore the explicit continuous physical presence lan-
guage of section 244(a). Upon further analysis, however, the 
cases are consistent with the development of the law in this area 
by the Ninth Circuit. 
The Ninth Circuit and the Board of Immigration Appeals 
had historically construed the language of section 244(a) strictly 
and held that any absence, however brief, broke the continuity 
of physical presence.8 However, in Wadman v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Service,9 the Ninth Circuit borrowed a concept 
developed by the Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Fleuti10 and 
indicated that the alien's five day vacation trip to Mexico was 
not a significant interruption of the continuous physical pres-
ence requirement. The court instructed that in determining 
"sufficient continuity," the finding should turn on "whether the 
interruption, viewed in balance with its consequences, can be 
said to have been a significant one."ll 
The approach of the Ninth Circuit in Wadman was adopted 
by the Board of Immigration Appeals12 and led to similar deci-
sions. In Git Foo Wong v. Immigration & Naturalization Ser-
vice/s the facts were simple for the court. The alien's departure 
consisted of a two hour Sunday sightseeing trip to Mexico. The 
court held that the visit "should not be regarded as meaning-
fully interruptive" of continuous presence in the United StateS.14 
In Toon-Ming Wong v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,16 
the alien had studied in Canada for six months at the age of 
sixteen. However, since the alien's journey, which originally had 
been planned to last only a week or two, was the result of his 
8. See ArrelIano-Flores v. Hoy, 262 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1958); In In re S-R-, 6 
I. & N. Dec. 405, 409 (B.I.A. 1954), the Board of Immigration Appeals pointed out: "[W]e 
have held that physical presence means just what it says and that a P!lrson who has been 
out of the United States during the period he is required to establish physical presence 
cannot establish that required physical presence." 
9. 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964). 
10. 374 U.S. 449 (1976). The Fleuti case involved the definition of "entry" under § 
101(a)(13} of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a}(13} (1976). The Supreme Court held that in 
order for a new "entry" to exist, there must be an intent to depart in a manner regarded 
as meaningfully interruptive of an alien's permanent residence. 374 U.S. at 462. 
11. 329 F.2d at 816. 
12. See, e.g., In re Wong, 12 I. & N. Dec. 271 (B.I.A. 1967). 
13. 358 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1966). 
14. 358 F.2d at 153. 
15. 363 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1966). 
3
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foster parents' orders and not an exercise of his own volition, the 
continuity requirement was not necessarily violated. Because of 
the age of the alien and the circumstances involved, Toon-Ming 
Wong cannot be generally cited for the proposition that a six 
month absence will be disregarded. However it is significant that 
the court stated that "length of absence is relevant, but not 
alone determinative."16 . 
After Mamanee v. Immigration & Naturalization Service/'1 
however, it was clear that although the continuous physical pres-
ence requirement would not be "rigidly construed", length of ab-
sence was an important factor in the Ninth Circuit.18 In that 
case the alien took two trips to Thailand. The first lasted five 
months and was taken to help her sick mother, and the second, 
with her husband and daughter, lasted nine months while her 
husband recovered from an injury. On those facts, the court 
found the alien ineligible for suspension because the "second de-
parture, if not the first, was a meaningful interruption" of the 
continuity requirement.19 
The Ninth Circuit clarified its standards for the continuous 
physical presence requirement in Kamheangpatiyooth v. Immi-
gration & Naturalization Service20 In that case the alien stu-
dent took a one month trip to Thailand during Christmas vaca-
tion to visit his mother who was gravely ill. It was his only 
absence from the United States during the twelve year period 
from his initial entry until his application for suspension of de-
portation. In finding the alien ineligible, the immigration judge 
and the Board of Immigration Appeals relied on three factors 
16. [d. at 236. The language in Toon-Ming Wong is quite limiting. The court dis-
cussed the importance of the fact that the alien was a minor and stated: 
[d. 
On the other hand, a very brief absence might suffice [to break 
the continuity requirement] if voluntary and accompanied by 
a realization of possible consequences to the alien's status as a 
United States resident, particularly if the journey abroad were 
motivated by a purpose inconsistent with the policies of the 
Act. 
17. 566 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1977). 
18. [d. at 1105. 
19. [d. 
20. 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979). See generally Note, Suspension of Deportation: A 
New Approach To The Continuous Physical Presence Requirement, 10 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 303 (1980) .. 
4
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mentioned in Rosenberg v. Fleuti:21 the length of visit, the pur-
poses thereof, and whether the alien had to obtain any travel 
documents.22 The judge and the Board concluded that because 
the alien traveled "several thousand miles", was away for a 
month, and obtained new documents, the continuous physical 
presence requirement was not met.28 The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the judge and the Board used an "erroneous legal 
standard."24 Instead, the court announced the following stan-
dard for determining when an alien's departure from the United 
States is meaningfully interruptive so as to break the continuous 
physical presence requirement: 
An absence cannot be significant or meaningfully 
interruptive of the whole period if indications are 
that the hardship of deportation to the alien 
would be equally severe had the absence not oc-
curred, and that no significant increase in the 
likelihood of deportation could reasonably have 
been expected to flow from the manner and cir-
cumstances surrounding the absence.25 
Thus, although the Fleuti factors are important, they are 
not "in themselves determinative" of the continuity require-
ment.26 Rather, they are "only evidentiary" on the central issue" 
of how the absence bears on the question of "the hardship and 
unexpectedness of exposure to expulsion" in suspension cases.2'1 
With that backdrop, the holdings in Chan and de Gallardo 
are easier to understand. Yet because of the lengthy absences 
involved, the decisions represent a major development in the 
line of cases involving the continuous physical presence 
requirement.2s 
21. See note 10 supra. 
22. 597 F.2d at 1257. 
23. The alien student in Kamheangpatiyooth obtained an immigration acceptance 
form from his school (Form 1-20A), extended his Thai passport, and obtained a new 
student visa abroad. ld. at 1257. 
24. ld. at 1260. 
25. ld. at 1257. 
26.ld. 
27.ld. 
28. Although Toon-Ming Wong v. I.N.S., 363 F.2d 234 (9th eir. 1966), involved a six 
month absence, the alien was an unemancipated youth who was following the orders of 
his foster parents. See note 16 supra. 
5
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The Chan case involved two aliens who were married. Dur-
ing the required period of time under section 244(a), the hus-
band took two trips dUling school vacation. One to Hong Kong 
lasted more than two an.d one-half months, and the other to Ca-
nada lasted six days. The wife made three departures-two trips 
to Hong Kong (lasting ninety-five and fifty-three days, respec-
tively) and a fifty-two day trip to Australia. On those facts, the 
immigration judge and Board of Immigration Appeals concluded 
that the time and distances of the trips broke the continuous 
physical presence requiJ~ement. The Ninth Circuit reversed and, 
in reaffirming the Kamheangpatiyooth standards, found that 
"in light of the [ameliorative] Congressional purposes behind the 
suspension of deportation statute," none of the absences were 
meaningfully interruptive of the continuous presence require-
ment.29 The Chan court was impressed by the fact that the trips 
were taken during school vacations, that no new travel docu-
ments were needed, tha.t nothing was suspicious about the trips, 
that the aliens traveled separately, and that they did not suspect 
that their status in the United States would be altered.80 
In de Gallardo, the alien traveled to Honduras for a three 
and one-half month vacation during the requisite period of con-
tinuous presence. In vacating the finding of the immigration 
judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals that the trip had 
interrupted the continuity requirement, the Ninth Circuit reiter-
ated the Kamheangpatiyooth standards and "held that length of 
absence, along with the other Fleuti factors, are not "determina-
tive" but are "guides" in determining "whether the alien's ab-
sence from this countrj is meaningfully interruptive" of the con-
tinuous physical presence requirement.81 
The Chan and de Gallardo holdings are therefore extremely 
significant because the absences involved were relatively lengthy, 
and the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed its Kamheangpatiyooth 
standards in continuous physical presence cases. The court has 
29. 610 F.2d at 655. 
30. Id. 
3!. 624 F.2d at 87. In de Gallardo, the court was also confronted with the charge 
that because the alien had reentered the United States under the pretext of intending to 
stay only a few days, the continuity requirement should be more rigidly construed. How-
ever, the court, citing Git Foo Wong, reaffirmed the principle that "not every violation of 
law taints an otherwise innocent trip abroad." 624 F.2d at 87. 
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made clear that length of absence is only one of many factors, 
and that in determining "meaningful interruption" in suspen-
sion cases the main issue is how the absence bears on the ques-
tion of the hardship and unexpectedness of exposure to 
expulsion.32 
B. Hardship Requirement 
In a major en banc decision, Wang v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Service,33 the Ninth Circuit announced important 
standards for the Board of Immigration Appeals and immigra-
tion judges to follow when presented with motions to reopen to 
apply for suspension and the issue of "extreme hardship" is in-
volved.34 However, in a blow to the liberalizing trend of the 
Ninth Circuit in suspension cases, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed without full briefing or oral argument.35 
The aliens, husband and wife, had previously been denied 
adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act in deportation 
proceedings. After the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed 
their appeal on the adjustment of status issue, the aliens moved 
to reopen their deportation proceedings in order to apply for 
suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1). However, the 
Board denied the motion to reopen on the grounds that the 
aliens had failed to make a prima facie showing of extreme 
hardship. 
The claim of extreme hardship in Wang was twofold. First, 
the aliens asserted that their two United States citizen children, 
who could not speak Korean, would suffer "serious economic, 
educational, and cultural difficulties" if forced to leave the 
32. 597 F.2d at 1257; 624 F.2d at 87. 
33. 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Choy, J.) (en bane), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 1027 
(1981). 
34. As in the requirement of continuous physical presence, the hardship require-
ment for suspension varies depending on the applicable ground for deportation. See note 
3 supra. H a serious ground for deportation is charged, then under section 244(a)(2) of 
the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1976), there must be a showing that the deportation 
would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the alien, or to the 
citizen or resident spouse, parent or child of the alien. H a less serious ground for depor-
tation is charged, then the less rigorous requirement of "extreme hardship" is used under 
§ 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976). Motions to reopen are governed by 
the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1980). 
35. I.N.S. v. Wang, 101 S. Ct. 1027 (1981). 
7
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United States with their parents.38 Second, the aliens argued 
that deportation would "impose a severe economic hardship on 
themselves."3'1 The respondents had purchased a dry cleaning 
business valued at $75,000 and a home valued at $60,000. They 
had approximately $44,000 in assets and liabilities of $81,000. 
Apparently, none of the allegations of hardship in support of the 
motion to reopen was supported by sworn statements or by 
evidentiary materials, as required by 8 C.F.R. section 3.8(a) 
(1980).38 
The Ninth Circuit first acknowledged that an "alien cannot 
gain favored status merely because he has a child who is a 
United States citizen/'39 However, the court recognized that 
children are within the protected class of relatives mentioned in 
section 244(a)(1), and believed that the severity of hardship to 
them "is difficult to discern without a hearing."4o As to the claim 
of economic hardship, the Ninth Circuit also acknowledged that 
economic loss alone was insufficient to find extreme hardship, 
but stated: 
Economic loss is not the same as economic hard-
ship. An alien who is forced to sell property be-
cause he is bEling deported, whether he shows a 
financial loss or a profit, might, nonetheless, suf-
fer hardship. Moreover, where an alien is forced 
to sell a business that has taken him years of hard 
work to establish, the hardship to the alien can-
not be measw~ed by any dollar amount.41 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Board should have 
granted a hearing where "a showing of economic hardship is 
combined with some other substantial hardship."42 
The Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had 
Q 
36. 622 F.2d at 1347-48. 
37. Id. at 1348. 
38. 101 S. Ct. at 1030. T.n pertinent part, 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a)(1980) provides: "The 
Board in its discretion may grant or deny oral argument. Motions to reopen shall state 
the new facts to be proved at the reopened hearing and shall be supported by affidavits 
or other evidentiary material" 
39. 622 F.2d at 1348 (citing Choe v. I.N.S., 597 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1979». 
40. 622 F.2d at 1348 (citing Urbano de Malaluan v. I.N.S., 577 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 
1978». 
41. 622 F.2d at 1348-49. 
42. [d. at 1349. 
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erred in two respects. First the Supreme Court believed that the 
Ninth Circuit had ignored the language of 8 C.F.R. section 3.8(a) 
which sets forth the requirements of a motion to reopen.48 Spe-
cifically, the regulation requires that the motion be "supported 
by affidavits or other evidentiary material." Since the allegations 
of hardship in the case had been "in the main conclusory and 
unsupported by affidavit," the Supreme Court concluded that 
the Ninth Circuit's. grant of a new hearing "circumvented" the 
cited language of the regulation.44 
The Supreme Court's second ground for reversal is more 
troubling. The Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had "en-
croached" on the authority to determine extreme hardship 
which the Act conferred on the Attorney General and his dele-
gates, viz., the Board of Immigration Appeals. The import of 
this ground for reversal is the Supreme Court's mandate. that 
virtually absolute deference must be paid to the Board's deter-
mination of what constitutes a prima facie case of extreme hard-
ship for suspension purposes. In criticizing the Ninth Circuit's 
liberal approach to the granting of a new hearing in suspension 
cases, the Supreme Court stated: "The Attorney General and his 
delegates have the authority to construe 'extreme hardship' nar-
rowly should they deem it wise to do so. Such a narrow interpre-
tation is consistent with the 'extreme hardship' language which 
itself indicates the exceptional nature of the suspension rem-
edy. "415 This decision appears, therefore, to effectively foreclose 
review by the courts of appeals of decisions of the Board of Im-
migration Appeals denying motions to reopen to apply for sus-
pension where the primary issue is extreme hardship. The deter-
mination as to what constitutes a prima facie case of extreme 
hardship is left to the Board by the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Wang is a serious setback 
to the Ninth Circuit's trend of fairness to aliens in suspension 
cases.46 Yet, the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Wang and in a com-
panion case, Villena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service:? 
are not exactly what the Supreme Court might have character-
43. 101 s. Ct. at 1030. See note 38 supra. 
44. [d. 
45. [d. at 1031. 
46. See text accompanying notes 5·32 supra. 
47. 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Choy. J.) (en bane). 
9
Hing: Immigration Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
294 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.ll:294 
ized them to be. Wang and Villena were remanded to the Board 
on the issue of improper denial of a motion to reopen. The 
Ninth Circuit in Wang had reminded practitioners that: 
Although an alien who sets forth a prima facie 
case of eligibility for relief must be afforded a 
hearing, the mere fact that a prima facie case is 
made does not lpreordain the result of the hearing. 
Proof of eligibility does not compel that relief be 
granted . . . but only triggers the exercise of the 
Attorney General's discretion to determine 
whether the alien merits the relief.48 
Thus it could be argued that all the Ninth Circuit was doing in 
Wang was to insure that the alien had a fair hearing on the sus-
pension application, not to substitute its opinion of what consti-
tuted extreme hardship at the hearing itself. Viewed in that 
light, the Supreme Court decision in Wang represents an over-
reaction to a mere due process/fair hearing concept rather than 
substantive grants of suspension of deportation. 
For practitioners, the end to this chapter in the suspension 
of deportation area will be written by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals which has, with the Supreme Court's opinion in Wang, 
received the blessing of the nation's highest court to act almost 
at will in determining when to grant an alien's motion to reopen 
to apply for suspensioll of deportation when the primary issue is 
extreme hardship. 
II. ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS-MOTION TO REOPEN 
In a troubling en banc decision, Obitz v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Service,49 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a Board of 
Immigration Appeals denial of an alien's motion to reopen to 
apply for adjustment of status to that of a permanent resident. 
This was done in spite of the fact that the alien had recently 
married a United States citizen, the alien was the beneficiary of 
an approved visa petition filed by her husband, and the govern-
ment did not dispute the alien's statutory eligibility for ad-
justment of status. 50 The result is surprising in light of the 
Ninth Circuit's recent holdings favoring the grant of motions to 
48. Id. at 1347. 
49. 623 F.2d 1331 (9th eir. 1980) (per Sneed, J.) (en bane). 
50. Id. at 1332. 
10
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reopen in the much more discretionary area of suspension of 
deportation. lSI 
The facts in Obitz are important in order to understand the 
context of the motion to reopen in question. On February 26, 
1977 while under an order to depart the United States by March 
18, 1977, the alien married a United States citizen.1S2 After her 
husband filed an immediate relativelS3 petition for her, the alien 
moved to reopen her deportation hearing in order to request ex-
tended voluntary departure while the petition was pending. This 
request was denied by the Board and the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
in an unpublished decision.1S" The immediate relative visa peti-
tion was approved on December 10, 1977, so the alien filed a new 
motion to reopen to apply for adjustment of status. ISIS The Board 
denied the new request to reopen as well, ISS and the Ninth Cir-
cuit followed suit. IS? 
The court distinguished the suspension motion to reopen 
situations of Wang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service lSs 
and Urbano de Malaluan v. Immigration & Naturalization Ser-
vice lS9 from the adjustment motion to reopen with questionable 
51. See discussion of Wang in text accompanying notes 33-48 supra. 
52. 623 F.2d at 1332. 
53. The immediate relative category is provided for in § 201(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1151(b) (1976), which provides: 
The immediate relatives referred to in subsection (a) of 
this section shall mean the children, spouses, and parents of a 
citi2en of the United States: Provided, That in the case of par-
ents, such citi2en must be at least twenty-one years of age. 
The immediate relatives specified in this subsection who are 
otherwise qualified for admission as immigrants shall be ad-
mitted as such, without regard to the numerical limitations in 
this Chapter. 
54. 623 F.2d at 1332. This initial motion to reopen to apply for extended voluntary 
departure from the Board appears to be in itself inappropriate. Authority to extend vol-
untary departure time specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board is "within 
the sole jurisdiction of the district director." 8 C.F.R. § 244.2 (1980). 
55. The alien was not eligible to apply for adjustment of status until the visa peti-
tion was approved. 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(d) (1980). Also, because deportation proceedings had 
commenced, it can be presumed that an order to show cause had been issued. 8 C.F.R. § 
242.1(a) (1980). Therefore, the request for adjustment of status could not be made to the 
district director who lost jurisdiction over adjustment as soon as the order to show cause 
was served. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a) (1980). 
56. 623 F.2d at 1332. 
57. ld. at 1333. 
58. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. 
59. 577 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1978). 
11
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rationale. Basically, the court re,asoned that statutory eligibility 
for suspension of deportation was a discretionary determination, 
due to the extreme hardship requirement which was difficult to 
make without a hearing.6o However, statutory eligibility for "ad-
justment of status does not involve a discretionary determina-
tion. Eligibility turns on compliance with fixed statutory stan-
dards/'sl Thus, the court believed that unlike the suspension 
cases, a determination of statutory eligibility for adjustment of 
status did not require a hearing.62 Rather, the inquiry should be 
whether the alien seeking adjustment of status had presented 
new evidence "that hears on whether the Attorney General 
should exercise his discretion to adjust her status now that her 
statutory eligibility has been established."ss The court believed 
that the alien had not done so because her statutory eligibility 
had been established by the "essentially ministerial act of the 
Service" approving the visa petition, and the facts were substan-
tially as they were when the first motion to reopen had been 
made for voluntary departure.M 
The dissent in ObitzS5 pointed out several flaws in the ma-
jority's analysis. First, the eligibility determination for adjust-
ment of status is not "essentially ministerial" given the thirty-
three grounds for exclusion found in section 212(a)66 of the Act 
which must be satisfi.ed.67 Second, the holding in Urbano de 
Malaluan ordered a hearing reopened not for the sole purpose of 
determining eligibility, but also to determine whether discretion 
should be granted.6s The dissent pointed out: "The majority ap-
proach therefore penalizes an alien for making too strong a 
showing of eligibility. In addition, under the majority view, there 
is nothing to prevent the Service from defeating the alien's right 
to a hearing through the simple expedient of stipulating to eligi-
bility."69 Additionally, the approval of the visa petition was an 
60. 623 F.2d at 1333. 
61. Id. at 1332. 
62. Id. at 1333. 
63.Id. 
64.Id. 
65. Id. at 1333-37 (per Tang, J.). 
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
67. 623 F.2d at 1335. 
68. Id. at 1336. 
69. Id. The majority's position is particularly bothersome because it literally con-
dones the government's refusal to exercise discretion once statutory eligibility has been 
12
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important new fact because it indicated the government's satis-
faction that the marriage was bona fide. '10 Furthermore, the dis-
sent strongly argued that as a matter of policy, it is judicially 
wise to treat motions to reopen uniformly for analogous remedial 
statutes. 
The Obitz decision comes as a surprise to the immigration 
practitioner who correctly views adjustment of status under sec-
tion 245 as a much more straight-forward relief than suspension 
of deportation under section 244. In practice, relief under sec-
tion 245 is generally granted without much question once eligi-
bility is established, and this fact serves as the basis for the un-
settling feeling derived from the result in Obitz. 
The effect of Obitz is, however, quite limited given the 
Board's decision in In re Matter of Garcia,'1l of which the Ninth 
Circuit was apparently unaware. Garcia was decided by the 
Board of Immigration Appeals subsequent to the second motion 
to reopen in Obitz and involved similar facts. The alien in Gar-
cia was under an order to depart voluntarily when he married a 
United States citizen. In accordance with a new regulation,'12 the 
alien simultaneously submitted the visa petition and adjustment 
of status application and moved to reopen for relief under sec-
tion 245.'13 In one large sense, therefore, the alien in Obitz, whose 
visa petition had been approved, was in a much better position 
than the alien in Garcia. Yet in Garcia, the Board held as a mat-
ter of policy that a motion to reopen should be granted to such a 
person "unless clear ineligibility is apparent in the record. "'14 It 
would appear, therefore, that persons such as the alien in Obitz 
established. The failure to exercise discretion has traditionally been grounds for revers-
ing the Board. See Asimakopoulos v. I.N.S., 445 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1971). 
70. 623 F.2d at 1336. 
71. Interim Decision 2684 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 1978). 
72. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2) (1980) provides in pertinent part: 
If a visa petition is submitted simultaneously with the ad-
justment application, the adjustment application shall be re-
tained for processing only if approval of the petition when 
reached for adjudication would make a visa immediately avail-
able at the time of filing of the adjustment application. If such 
petition is subsequently approved, the date of tiling the ad-
justment application shall be deemed the date on which the 
accompanying petition was tiled. 
73. Interim Decision 2684, at 2. 
74. Id. at 3. 
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would certainly fall within the policy of Garcia, and the Board 
will grant a motion to reopen, particularly where the government 
concedes eligibility. 
III. VIABILITY REQUIREMENT FOR MARRIAGES 
Under section 201(b) of the Act,'1!> the alien spouse of a 
United States citizen is classified as an immediate relative for 
immigration purposes. However, it has long been established 
that if a marriage is a sham or fraudulent from its inception, the 
marriage shall not bestow immigration benefits on the alien.'16 
The more difficult policy question arises when the marriage was 
not a sham or fraudulent from its inception, but the marriage 
has become nonviability or "factually dead," although not le-
gally terminated. 
The Ninth Circuit addressed this question in a limited form 
last term in Dabaghian v. Civiletti.'1'1 Mter marrying a United 
States citizen, the alieJO. student in Dabaghian applied for and 
was granted adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent 
resident in 1972.'18 However, in 1974 the I.N.S. moved under sec-
tion 246 of the Act'1S to rescind the adjustment of status on the 
ground that the alien had not been eligible for it in 1972.80 The 
75. See note 53 supra. 
76. See Bark v. I.N.S., 511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975); Garcia-Jaramillo v. I.N.S., 604 
F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1979). Under § 241(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1976), an ali~n 
who has obtained immigrant status on the basis of of a sham marriage is deportable. 
Furthermore, under § 204(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (1980), an alien who 
previously entered on the basin of a sham marriage is forever precluded from being the 
beneficiary of another petition. 
77. 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Choy, J.; the other panel members were Ander-
son, J., and Hug, J.). 
78. ld. at 869. 
79. Section 246 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1256 (1976), provides in relevant part: 
If, at any time within five years after the status of a person 
has been otherwise adjusted under the provisions of section 
1255 or 1259 of this title [§ 245 or 249 of the Act] or any other 
provision of law to that of an alien lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence, it shall appear to the satisfaction of the At-
torney General that the person was not in fact eligible for such 
adjustment of status, the Attorney General shall rescind the 
action taken gr8Ilting an adjustment of status to such person 
and compelling deportation in the case of such person if that 
occurred and the person shall thereupon be subject to all pro-
visions of this Act to the S8IDe extent as if the adjustment of 
status had not been made. 
SO. 607 F.2d at 869. 
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basis of the government's argument was that at the time of ad-
justment of status, the couple was separated and the marriage 
was "dead in fact," even though still legally alive.81 However, the 
government never claimed or proved that the marriage was a 
sham or fraud. 
In rejecting the government's position, the court pointed out 
that there was no statutory or federal case law to support the 
nonviability or "dead in fact," theory and stated, "If a marriage 
is not sham or fraudulent from its inception, it is valid for the 
purposes of determining eligibility for adjustment of status 
under § 245 of the Act until it is legally dissolved. "82 Further-
more, the alien's purported ineligibility depended on whether he 
was the "spouse of a United States citizen at the time of adjust-
ment," and because the word "spouSes" in section 201(b) "in-
cludes the parties to all marriages that are ... not sham," the 
alien was not ineligible under section 245 of the Act.83 The court 
thereby reversed the Board and ordered that the' alien be 
reinstated. 8~ 
The Dabaghian decision does not necessarily sound the 
death knell of the application of the viability requirement in im~ 
migration cases. The Dabaghian panel had to wrestle with an 
earlier Ninth Circuit decision, Menezes v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Service,8G which contained troublesome language sup-
porting the application of the viability requirement. Menezes in-
volved a marriage and an actual section 245 adjustment of status 
application. At the deportation hearing, the immigration judge 
found the alien statutorily eligible, but denied the application as 
a matter of discretion because the couple had been separated for 
some time.88 By the time Menezes reached the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals, the alien and his United States citizen spouse 
were divorced, thus he was ineligible for adjustment of status 
81. ld. 
82. ld. 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(d) (1980) provides that an applicant is not eligible for a 
§ 245 adjustment unless a visa petition has been filed and approved. However, under 8 
C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(4) (1980), the approval of a visa petition is automatically revoked when 
the relationship of husband and wife is legally terminated. 
83. 607 F.2d at 871. 
84.ld. 
85. 601 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1979). 
86. ld. at 1029-30. 
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because the -approved ,.lisa petition was automatically revoked.87 
However, rather than affirming the Board's decision on that 
point, the Menezes panel went on to affirm the immigration 
judge's discretionary authority to deny adjustment under section 
245 if the marriage is no longer vial?le: 
Congress provided that, to be admitted for 
permanent residence, immediate relatives must 
submit to the discretion of the Attorney General 
by applying for adjustment of status under § 245. 
In determinillg whether to grant permanent 
resident statUB based on a marriage, it is highly 
relevant that the relationship may no longer be in 
existence wben the application is under 
consideration.88 
The Dabaghian panel first labeled as dictum the Menezes 
panel's approval of the immigration judge's discretionary denial 
of adjustment on the ·basis of the non-sham, but nonviable mar-
riage.89 But the Dabaghian panel went out of its way to point 
out that this dictum did not conflict with its own holding be-
cause the "INS discretion that the Menezes lnimigration Judge 
relied on comes into play only after eligibility under § 245 has 
been established; Menezes did not deny that any legally valid, 
non-sham marriage suffices for § 245 eligibility."90 
Thus, the Dabaghian panel viewed its decision as a statu-
tory eligibility case. In other words, the party to a non-sham but 
nonviable marriage llIlay meet the statutory eligibility require-
ments for adjustment of status under section 245, ·but the Attor-
ney General may "in his discretion" still deny adjustment if the 
marriage is "factually dead." Therefore, even after Dabaghian, 
the government may still deny section 245 adjustment in a mar-
riage case where the relationship is not viable.91 
87. See note 82 supra. 
88. 601 F.2d at 1035. 
89. 607 F.2d at 871. 
9O.Id. 
91. Recently in In re McKee, Interim Decision 2782 (B.I.A. 1980), the Board of Im-
migration Appeals struck down viabilitycif marriage as a requirement for approval of a 
visa petition and adopted the reaSoning in Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978). 
However, the Board has not squarely faced the issue of whether, once the visa petition 
has been approved and the immigration judge adjudicates an adjustment application, the 
immigration judge may in. his or her discretion deny the § 245 adjustment application on 
nonviability grounds. It seems incongruous that the Board would permit such a result, 
but the language in Dabaghian certainly would sustain such a result. 
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IV. VIOLATION OF REGULATIONS 
The Ninth Circuit decided several cases in the past term 
raising the issue of what effect the government's violation of its 
own regulations has on deportation proceedings. United States 
v. Vega-Mejia,92 United States v. Rangel-Gonzales,98 and 
United States v. Lagarda-AguilarM were criminal cases in which 
the defendants were being charged with illegally reentering the 
United States after having been previously deported, a violation 
of section 276 of the Act.911 Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Nat-
uralization Service96 was a deportation case. 
In Vega-Mejia and Rangel-Gonzales the defendants argued 
that the~ underlying deportations were unlawful because the 
I.N.S. had failed to advise them of the right to confer with Mex-
ican consular officials prior to hearing as required by 8 C.F.R. 
section 242.2(e).9'1 Both defendants relied heavily on United 
States v. Calderon-Median98 for their collateral attacks on de-
92. 611 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam; the members of the panel were 
Duniway, J., Choy, J., and Peck, D.J., sitting by designation). 
93. 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Schroeder, J., the other members of the panel 
were Merrill, J., and Tang, J.). 
94. 617 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Schroeder, J.; the other members of the panel 
were Merrill, J., and Tang, J.). 
95. Section 276 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976), provides: 
Any alien who-
(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported, 
and thereafter 
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the 
United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place 
outside the United States of his application for admission 
from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has 
expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admission; 
or (B) with respect to an alien previously excluded and de-
ported, unless such alien shall establish that he was not re-
quired to obtain such advance consent under this or any prior 
Act, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, 
be punished by imprisonment of not more than two years, or 
by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. 
96. 626 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Bartels, D.J., sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Choy, J., and Ferguson, J.). 
97. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e) (1980), in relevant part provides: "Every detained alien shall 
be notified that he may communicate with the consular of diplomatic officers of the 
country of his nationality in the United States." 
98. 691 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979). Rangel-Gonzales was actually first before the 
Ninth Circuit as a companion to Calderon-Medina. However, the case was remanded to 
allow the defendant the opportunity to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the I.N.S. 
regulation violation. ld. at 532. 
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portation based on violations of I.N.S. regulations. In Calderon-
Medina, the Ninth Circuit adopted a two-step test to determine 
whether violation of a given regulation invalidates the deporta-
tion.99 First the regulation itself must serve a purpose of benefit 
to the alien, and second, the I.N.S. violation must have 
prejudiced interests of' the alien which were protected by the 
regulation. 
Using the Calderon-Medina test, the court in Rangel-
Gonzales first found that 8 C.F.R. section 242.2{e) serves a pur-
pose of benefit to the Bllien.100 "It was intended to insure compli-
ance with this country's treaty obligations to promote assistance 
from their country of origin for aliens facing deportation pro-
ceedings in the United States.mol As to the issue of predjudice, 
the court analyzed the evidence presented by both parties and 
concluded that the defendant satisfied his burden of establishing 
that he did not know about his right to consult with consular 
officials, that he would have availed himself of the right had he 
known of it, and that he would have obtained assistance in 
resisting deportation.lo2 The court therefore dismissed the 
indictment. lOS 
The defendant in Vega-Mejia was not as successful. The 
court affirmed the district court finding that the defendant was 
not prejudiced by the regulation violation in that the defendant 
would not have spoken to the Mexican consul.lo, Additionally, 
99. [d. at 531. 
100. 617 F.2d at 530. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. at 531. The evidence submitted by the defendant indicated that he would 
have probably obtained voluntary departure under § 244(e) rather than deportation. Sec-
tion 244(e) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1976) provides: 
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien 
under deportation proceedings, other than an alien within th~ 
provisions of paragraph (4), (5), (6), (7), (11), (12), (14), (15), 
(16), (17), or (18), of section 1251 of this title [§ 241(0) of the 
Act] (and also any alien within the purview of such 
paragraphs if he is also within the provisions of paragraph (2) 
of subsection (11) of this section), to depart voluntarily from 
the United States at his own expense in lieu of deportation if 
such alien shall establish to the satisfaction of the Attorney 
General that he is, and has been, a person of good moral char-
acter for at least five years immediately preceding his applica-
tion for voluntary departure under this subsection. 
103. 617 F.2d at 533. 
104. 611 F.2d at 752. 
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the record reflected that the defendant's main concern was to 
"avoid detention and delay" his return to Mexico.loll 
The defendant in United States v. Lagarda-Aguilar admit-
ted that he had previously been deported in 1977.106 However, 
he returned in 1978 under the discretionary parole status 
authority of the Attorney General of section 212(d)(5) of the 
Act.10? When the government sought to terminate the defen-
dant's parole status, agents merely escorted him to the Mexican 
border without formal written notice as required by 8 C.F.R. 
section 212.5(b).108 The court affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of the indictment without even having to refer to the 
Calderon-Medina test since the requirement of written notice is 
the "only safeguard, for both the alien and the United States 
government, that parole status is administered in an orderly 
manner. "109 
The alien in Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Naturalization 
Service was facing deportation rather than criminal charges. 
105.ld. 
106. 617 F.2d at 527. 
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976), provides: 
The Attorney General may [except as provided in subpar-
agraph (b)J, in his discretion parole into the United States 
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for 
emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public 
interest any alien applying for admission to the United States, 
but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an ad-
mission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole 
shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served 
the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody 
from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall con-
tinue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other 
applicant for admission to the United States. 
108. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (1980) provides: 
Termination of parole. At the expiration of the period of 
time or upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole 
was authorized or when the opinion of the district director in 
charge of the area in which the alien is located that neither 
emergency nor public interest warrants the continued pres-
ence of the alien in the United States, parole shall be termi-
nated upon written notice to the alien and he shall be restored 
to the status which he had at the time of parole, and further 
inspection or hearing shall be conducted under section 235 or 
236 of the Act [8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226] and this chapter, or 
any order of exclusion and deportation previously entered 
shall be executed. 
109. 617 F.2d at 528. 
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However on appeal he argued that the failure of the I.N.S. to 
advise him of his right to contact the Mexican consul violated 8 
C.F.R. section 242.2{e) citing Calderon-Medinapo The argu-
ment was somewhat novel because in Rangel-Gonzales, Vega-
Mejia, and Lagarda-Aguilar, the defendants were not contesting 
deportability, but rather were challenging their criminal indict-
ments. However, in Tejeda-Mata, the alien appears to have 
been raising the violation of regulation question as a defense to 
deportability itself. The court actually did not meet this ques-
tion squarely because the alien had failed to r&ise the issue be-
low and was deemed not to have exhausted administrative reme-
dies.ll1 If the court had gone on to the Calderon-Medina test in 
this particular case, it is doubtful that the alien would have ben-
efited by its application because of the regulation involved. 
Where an alien is clearly deportable, as was the case in Tejeda-
Mata, the only real benefit that such an alien might derive from 
exercising the right to contact the foreign consul is that the con-
sul could assist in obtaining voluntary departure in lieu of de-
portation.1l2 Such was the case in Rangel-Gonzales. However, in 
Tejeda-Mata, the alien had already been granted the privilege 
of voluntary departure by the immigration judgepa Thus, it 
would have been difficult for the alien to make a showing of 
prejudice as required. by Calderon-Medina.1H 
However, the importance of Tejeda-Mata lies in the court's 
apparent willingness to entertain a timely raised violation of reg-
ulation argument in the deportation setting itself. As long as the 
two-step test of Calderon-Medina is met, it appears that the 
Ninth Circuit will be prepared to fashion relief which will allevi-
ate the demonstrated prejudice to the alien.u5 
110. 626 F.2d at 725. 
111. [d. at 726. 
112. See note 102 infra. 
113. 626 F.2d at 723. 
114. Prejudice could be shown if there were defenses or relief other than voluntary 
departure which were available to the alien, which the consul would have assisted on. 
However, the record in Tejeda-Mata did not suggest the possibility of any other relief. 
115. In Sun n Y 00 v. I.N.S. 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976), the court used a violation 
of regulation theory in a deportation setting to support the major contention that there 
had been "affirmative misconduct" on the part of I.N.S. who should thereby be estopped. 
And in Mendez v. I.N.S., 563 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977), the court ordered that an alien be 
readmitted after being deported in violation of a regulation. See also, Cornell-Rodriguez 
v. I.N.S., 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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